This web-based syllabus is designed to be used throughout the semester. Below you will find links to the assignments for each of the 26 class sessions throughout the semester. Where possible, reading assignments have been linked to electronic versions available on the Internet. Otherwise, the assignment is available at the library  /Labrynth bookstore. Under the "materials" section of the class server, you will find the lecture notes for each session. (I will post the notes at the beginning of the semester, but the notes are subject to updates after each class session, depending on what we cover in class.)

Students visiting this page for the first time should read through the entire syllabus: the course description, the course requirements, the reading and the course outline. If you have any questions or comments about the web page or the course, please contact me.

1. Introduction to comparative politics (1/16/07) (0 PAGES)
2. What is an explanation? (1/18/07) (0 required PAGES)
3. What is the key difference between democracy and dictatorship? (1/23/07) (40 PAGES)
4. Does "culture" explain democracy? (1/25/07) (20 PAGES)
5. Why do repressive elites sometimes take a chance on democracy? (1/30/07) (30 PAGES)
6. Why do democracies emerge? (2/1/07) (45 PAGES)
7. What makes democracy endure? (2/6/07) (50 PAGES)
8. Why do democracies break down? (2/8/07) (50 PAGES)
9. Why do some groups organize more effectively than others? (2/13/07) (45 PAGES)
10. Does cultural conflict preclude democracy? (2/15/07) (25 PAGES)
11. How do political parties behave? (2/20/07) (50 PAGES + skim additional article)
12. Why don't the rich soak the poor under democracy? (2/22/07) (50 PAGES)
13. Does it matter when politicians ignore their promises? Why do politicians impose unpopular policies? (2/27/07) (35 PAGES)
14. Why are policies so stable in some countries but they change so often in others? (3/1/07) (35 PAGES)
15. How do domestic political institutions impact the way a government behaves in the international arena? (3/6/07) (50 PAGES)
16. What causes government corruption and what reforms can be used to address it? (3/8/07) (50 PAGES)
17. How do dictatorships survive? (3/27/07) (50 PAGES)
18. ***Midterm examination***  (3/29/07)
19. Will economic development lead to the democratization of China? (4/3/07) (35 PAGES)
20. Democracy vs. Dictatorship: Can voters control the state under democracy? (4/5/07) (50 PAGES)
21. How do communities and institutions shape each other? (4/10/07) (57 PAGES)
22. Do weak political institutions lead to civil war? (4/12/07) (40 PAGES)
23. Why are there revolutions? (4/17/07) (35 PAGES)
24. Is there a logic to political violence? (4/19/07) (50 PAGES)
25. Do democracies face commitment problems? (4/24/07) (0 PAGES)
26. Review (4/26/07) (0 PAGES)
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Course description
This course introduces students to important concepts, themes, and approaches in the comparative study of politics. Unlike other sub-fields of political science that have relatively well-defined areas of study (e.g., American Politics, International Relations, History of Political Thought, Formal Theory), the range of Comparative Politics is broad. Some people in Comparative Politics work on general questions such as, what are the effects of democracy and dictatorship? Others work on specific questions such as, what is the role of religion in Indian political parties? There are also various methodologies employed in Comparative Politics, including case studies, small-n comparisons, and large-n statistical studies. The field is united, however, by a commitment to test theories of political phenomena using empirical examples from throughout the world.

The course is organized around questions that reflect both interesting phenomena and puzzles that call for some kind of explanation. We will examine some of the answers to these questions that have been proposed on the basis of comparative research. By the end of the course, the student will have acquired a broad perspective of the field of Comparative Politics and the ability to relate some of his or her own interests to existing concerns of other scholars.

Topics include democracy, dictatorship, the economic role of the state, political parties and interest groups as well as questions of identity, ethnic conflict, civil war, violence, and revolution. In addition to established classics in the field, we will also study work-in-progress so that students can see how research goes from formative stages to final published versions. Although the emphasis of the course is on substance, methodological issues will also be discussed. Special attention is paid to the merits of a good explanation as well as questions of research design. What is an explanation? Keep this question in mind as we move through the different questions.
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Requirements

(1) Participation in Section (15%). Each section has a syllabus. See below.

(2) Short response paper (10%): Take any question we pose in class and critically evaluate an answer to it. Maximum 2 pages. (Due Tues., Feb. 20, 2007.)

(3) In-class Midterm examination (30%): Thurs., Mar. 29, 2007.

(4) Final paper (30%): Take your short response (or another question if you prefer) and examine the question more carefully. Do further research, comparing different approaches and explanations. Decide what you think is the best explanation and why. Suggestion: Write the paper as a research proposal for your senior essay. The paper should be 8 pages.
(Due: Friday, April 27, 2007.)
Students must submit papers in ELECTRONIC FORMAT using the "Drop Box" function on the Classes*v2 server.
The electronic version will also be due at 4 p.m.

(5) Final Exam (15%): Tues, May 8, 2007 (2pm). FINAL COVERS LECTURES 17, 19-25.
LOCATION: WHC, AUD; Tuesday, 8-May, 2:00PM-5:30PM

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Reading
Students will be expected to read 30 to 60 pages per class. Besides the required reading (in bold below), you will also find “recommended” and “background” reading. This is not required. It is provided for motivated students who wish to explore various issues in greater depth. Also, it may prove useful as additional research for class papers. Some readings are available on-line. URLs are provided below. Other readings are available on reserve at the library and available for purchase at Labyrinth Books.
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Course Outline

1. Introduction to comparative politics (1/16/07)
What is “comparative politics”? Why compare? Review the questions we will look at throughout the semester.
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2. What is an explanation? (1/18/07)
*Recommended* further reading:
Przeworski, Adam and Henry Teune. 1982. The Logic of Comparative Inquiry. Malebar, Florida: Krieger Publishing. Pages 3-30.
***Book on reserve at CCL*** THIS IS *NOT* REQUIRED READING!
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3. What is the key difference between democracy and dictatorship? (1/23/07)
REQUIRED: Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political Regimes and Economic Well-being in the World, 1950-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
CHAPTER 1
***Book available at Labyrinth Books and on reserve at CCL***

(Basically the same content is also available here:
Alvarez, Mike and José Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi, and Adam Przeworski. 1996. “Classifying political regimes.” Studies in Comparative International Development 31: 3-34.
***Available on-line from EBSCOhost.***)

Recommended
Gurr, Robert Ted and Keith Jaggers. 1999. Polity 98 Project. Available from http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity/

Kenneth A. Bollen. 1991. “Political Democracy: Conceptual and Measurement Traps” in Alex Inkeles, ed., On Measuring Democracy: Its Consequences and Concomitants. New Brunswick: Transaction Books. Pages 3-20.

4. Does "culture" explain democracy? (1/25/07)

REQUIRED: Seligson, Mitchell A. 2002. “The Renaissance of Political Culture or the Renaissance of the Ecological Fallacy?” Comparative Politics 34: 273-292.
***Available on-line.***

5. Why do repressive elites sometimes take a chance on democracy? (1/30/07)
REQUIRED: Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 20003. Forging Democracy from Below. New York: Cambridge University Press. CHAPTERS 1 & 8.
***Book available at Labyrinth Books and on reserve at CCL***
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6. Why do democracies emerge? (2/1/07)
REQUIRED: Huntington, Samuel P. 1965. “Political Development and Political Decay.” World Politics 17. Pages 386-430.
***Available on-line at www.jstor.org***

Like Almond and Verba, Huntington notes a “fundamental shift in values, attitudes, and expectations” in democratic cultures. What force drives this “shift”? Does Huntington share any common ground with Przeworski? What are the foreign policy implications of Huntington’s argument?
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7. What makes democracy endure? (2/6/07)
REQUIRED: Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political Regimes and Economic Well-being in the World, 1950-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
CHAPTER 2
***Book available at Labyrinth Books and on reserve at CCL***

(Similar content is also available here:
Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1997. “Modernization: Theories and Facts.” World Politics 49. Pages 155-183.
Available on-line.)

Last session Huntington introduced us to a correlation between per capita income and democracy. He concludes that modernization leads to democracy. How do Przeworski et al. explain this correlation? What mechanism do they suggest causes democracies to emerge? Are the policy implications of Przeworski et al.’s argument different from Huntington’s?
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8. Why do democracies break down? (2/8/07)
REQUIRED: Cohen, Youssef. 1994. Radicals, Reformers, and Reactionaries: The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Collapse of Democracy in Latin America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pages 1-9, 38-75, 119-124.
***Book available at Labyrinth Books and on reserve at CCL***

Last class we considered economic causes of democratic breakdown. This class we consider a political explanation, as Cohen introduces us to the prisoner’s dilemma, where two actors are unable to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome because of the incentive structure they face. Is Cohen’s explanation reconcilable with Przeworski et al.’s? Is one more general than the other? Are there “crucial” tests we could put to the two stories?

Recommended
Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 and 2.
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REQUIRED: Olson, Mancur. 1971. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Pages 5-52
***Book available at Labyrinth Books and on reserve at CCL***

How does Olson explain collective action? What role does culture play in Olson’s framework? Recall that Cohen introduced us to the prisoner’s dilemma. Since then, we have considered the collective action problems facing interest groups. Hardin (1982) argues that the logic of the prisoner’s dilemma is the same as that of collective action. Below is a list of readings on the collective action problem and its applications. Almost all of the readings are available on-line at www.jstor.org. You should read the abstracts of all available articles and read the entire articles of those that most interest you.

Bendor, Jonathan and Dilip Mookherjee. 1987. “Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action.” The American Political Science Review 81: 129-154.

Benvenisti, Eyal. 1996. “Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of International Water Resources Law.” American Journal of International Law 90: 384-415.

Crowley, Stephen. 1994. “Barriers to Collective Action: Steelworkers and Mutual Dependence in the Former Soviet Union.” World Politics 46: 589-615.

Gowa, Joanne. 1988. “Public Goods and Political Institutions: Trade and Monetary Policy Processes in the United States.” International Organization 42: 15-32.

Heckathorn, Douglas D. 1993. “Collective Action and Group Heterogeneity: Voluntary Provision Versus Selective Incentives.” American Sociological Review 58: 329-350.

Macy, Michael W. 1991. “Chains of Cooperation: Threshold Effects in Collective Action.” American Sociological Review 56: 730-747.

Muller, Edward N. and Karl-Dieter Opp. 1986. “Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action.” The American Political Science Review 80: 471-488.

Oliver, Pamela E. 1993. “Formal Models of Collective Action.” Annual Review of Sociology 19: 271-300.

Oneal, John R. 1990. “The Theory of Collective Action and Burden Sharing in NATO.” International Organization 44: 379-402.

Sabia, Daniel R. 1988. “Rationality, Collective Action, and Karl Marx.” American Journal of Political Science 32: 50-71.

Uhlaner, Carole J. 1989. “Rational Turnout: The Neglected Role of Groups.” American Journal of Political Science 33: 390-422.

Also recommended
Austen-Smith. 1981. “Voluntary Pressure Groups.” Economica 48. Pages 143-53.

Berry, Jeffrey M. 1996. “Madison’s Dilemma.” The Interest Group Society. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. Pages 1-15.

Becker, Gary S. 1983. “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 98. Pages 371-400.

Denzau, Arthur T. and Michael C. Munger. 1986. “Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests get Represented.” American Political Science Review 80. Pages 89-106.

Hardin, Garret. 1968. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science 162. Pages 1243-1248.

10. Does cultural conflict preclude democracy? (2/15/07)

REQUIRED: Kalyvas, Stathis N. 1998. “Democracy and Religious Politics: Evidence From Belgium.” Comparative Political Studies 31. Pages 292-320.
***Available on-line from EBSCOhost.***

Recall that cultural explanations of the survival of democracy were not supported by statistical evidence. Rather, the data indicate that economic explanations take precedence. But can democracy really survive in a culture hostile to democratic values? Kalyvas examines an analytically significant case – 19th century Belgium – to show that democratic institutions can survive based on material self-interest, even when cultural values oppose the principles of democracy.
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***Tuesday, Feb. 20: Short response due***

11. How do political parties behave? (2/20/07)
REQUIRED: Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper Collins Publishers. Pages 36-50, 114-141.
***Book available at Labyrinth Books and on reserve at CCL***

REQUIRED - but only SKIM!!! Cox, Gary W. 1990. “Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems.” American Journal of Political Science 34. Pages 903-35.
***Available on-line at www.jstor.org***

12. Why don't the rich soak the poor under democracy? (2/22/07)

REQUIRED: Scheve, Kenneth and David Stasavage. 2006. Religion and Preferences for Social Insurance. Quarterly Journal of Political Science Vol. 1 No. 3:255-86.
***Available On-line.***

REQUIRED: De La O, Ana and Jonathan Rodden. 2006. Does Religion Distract the Poor? Income and Issue Voting around the World. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April.
***Available On-line.***

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13. Does it matter when politicians ignore their promises? Why do politicians impose unpopular policies? (2/27/07)
REQUIRED: Stokes Susan C., 2001. Mandates and Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. CHAPTERS 1 & 7.
***Book available at Labyrinth Books and on reserve at CCL***
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14. Why are policies so stable in some countries but they change so often in others? (3/1/07)
REQUIRED: Tsebelis, George. 1995. “Decision Making in Political Systems.” British Journal of Political Science 25: 289-326.
***Available on-line at www.jstor.org***
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15. How do domestic political institutions impact the way a government behaves in the international arena? (3/6/07)
This class will examine areas considered to be in the sub-fields of both International Relations and Comparative Politics. Students should be aware that there is increasing overlap between these fields.

REQUIRED: Vreeland, James Raymond. 2003. The IMF and Economic Development. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 3.
***Book available at Labyrinth Books and on reserve at CCL***

16. What causes government corruption and what reforms can be used to address it? (3/8/07)
REQUIRED: Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. Corruption and Government. New York: Cambridge University Press. CHAPTERS 8, 9.
***Book available at Labyrinth Books and on reserve at CCL***
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  ***Spring Break***
 

17.  How do dictators survive? (3/27/07)

REQUIRED: Ramseyer, J. Mark and Frances McCall Rosenbluth. 1998. The Politics of Oligarchy. New York: Cambridge University Press. CHAPTERS 1, 11.
***Book available at Labyrinth Books and on reserve at CCL***

19. Will economic development lead to the democratization of China? (4/3/07)

READING:
REQUIRED: Landry, Pierre. 2005. Administrative Conflicts in China: Initiation, Escalation and Resolution. Ms. Department of Political Science, Yale University.
***Available On-line.***

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20. Democracy vs. Dictatorship: Can voters control the state under democracy? (4/5/07)

REQUIRED: Rosendorff, B. Peter and James Raymond Vreeland. 2006. Democracy and Data Dissemination: The Effect of Political Regime on Transparency. Ms.
***Available On-line.***

REQUIRED: Mani, Anandi and Sharun W. Mukand. 2000. “Democracy and the Politics of Visibility.” Prepared for the Leitner Conference on the Political Economy of Development, Yale University. March 16-18.
***Available On-line.***

Recommended
Przeworski, Adam. 1997. “The State in a Market Economy.” In Joan M. Nelson, Charles Tilly, and Lee Walker: Transforming Post-Communist Political Economies. Washington DC: National Academy Press. Pages 411-431.

21. How do communities and institutions shape each other? (4/10/07)

REQUIRED: Sawyer, Mark Q. 2006. Racial Politics in Post-Revolutionary Cuba. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 2 & 3.
***Book available at Labyrinth Books and on reserve at CCL***

REQUIRED: Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities. New York: Verso. Pages 1-7, 36-46 (Be sure to read the last two paragraphs of Chapter 2).
***Book available at Labyrinth Books and on reserve at CCL***

This class we explore the question of identity. Chapter 5 of the Sawyer book is highly recommended further reading for those interested in interview findings about race and daily life in the Spanish Caribbean.

Recommended
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Any.

Lloyd, S. A. 1992. Ideals As Interests in Hobbes's Leviathan: The Power of Mind over Matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

22. Do weak political institutions lead to civil war? (4/12/07)

REQUIRED: Hegre, Havard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2001. “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992.” American Political Science Review 95: 33-48.
***Available at http://journals.cambridge.org***

23. Why are there revolutions? (4/17/07)
REQUIRED: Goodwin, Jeff. 1994. “Toward a new sociology of revolutions.” Theory and Society 23/6: 731-766.
***Available on-line at www.jstor.org***

We turn to a difficult subject: revolutions. How do we define revolution? What different approaches have been used to address the question?

Background
Aya, Rod. 1990. Rethinking revolutions and collective violence: studies on concept, theory, and method. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.

Goldstone, Jack. 1991. “An Analytical Framework.” In Jack Goldstone, Ted Gurr and Farrokh Moshiri (eds.): Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century. Westview Press.

Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions: a Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press: 3-43, 285-293.

Skocpol, Theda. 1985. “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research” in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.): Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pages 3-37.

Taylor, Michael. 1988. “Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action.” In Michael Taylor (ed.), Rationality and Revolution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 63-97.

Tilly, Charles. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. Addison-Wesley.
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24. Is there a logic to political violence? (4/19/07)
REQUIRED: Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. New York: Cambridge University Press. PAGES: 16-31, 195-209.
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25. Do democracies face commitment problems? (4/24/07)
What is a “time inconsistent preference” problem? Do democracies face this kind of a problem? If so, how can they address the problem? In what other situations do we observe this kind of dilemma?
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26. Review (4/26/07)
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***Friday, April 27, 2007: Final Paper due by 4pm.***
***Location: 124 Prospect Street***
 

Books on reserve and available at the Labyrinth Books:
Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities. New York: Verso.

Cohen, Youssef. 1994. Radicals, Reformers, and Reactionaries: the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Collapse of Democracy in Latin America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper Collins Publishers.

Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sawyer, Mark Q. 2006. Racial Politics in Post-Revolutionary Cuba. Cambridge University Press.

Olson, Mancur. 1971. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political Regimes and Economic Well-being in the World, 1950-1990. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Ramseyer, J. Mark and Frances McCall Rosenbluth. 1998. The Politics of Oligarchy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. Corruption and Government. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Stokes Susan C., 2001. Mandates and Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Vreeland, James Raymond. 2003. The IMF and Economic Development. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 20003. Forging Democracy from Below. New York: Cambridge University Press.

RECOMMENDED (but not available at Labrynth):
Przeworski, Adam and Henry Teune. 1982. The Logic of Comparative Inquiry. Malebar, Florida: Krieger Publishing.
(Of particular interest for students interested in the philosophy of science.)

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Contact Instructor:
James Raymond Vreeland
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science
email: james.vreeland@yale.edu
web: http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/jrv24/
tel: 203-432-6220

Office hours: Tuesday afternoons (2-4pm)
Office location: 124 Prospect Street, Room 305. Click here for directions.
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Contact Teaching Assistants:

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