Who are the winners and losers from globalization? How are their political preferences translated into policy outcomes?

In addressing globalization’s winners and losers of globalization and economic relations, this course takes an "institutional" approach. We address the effects that domestic and international political institutions have on three central economic issues: trade, finance, and economic development.

The course begins with the big three international institutions: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). These institutions, respectively, create frameworks to lend large sums of international finance during economic crises, to provide targeted finance to promote economic development, and to promote international trade and resolve trade disputes.

The course then considers domestic political regimes: democracy versus autocracy, briefly addressing other domestic institutions, such as presidentialism versus parliamentarism, political parties, legislatures, and labor unions. Domestic political institutions determine how governments survive in office, for example, by winning elections (under democracy) or by other means (as in authoritarian regimes). In this section of the course, we also address the desirability of democratic regimes, raising questions of human rights and economic performance.

Next, the course turns to the ways in which international and domestic institutions interact to influence patterns of trade, finance, and development. Finally, the course concludes with a broader consideration of global governance, asking what needs to change, and addressing regional institutional solutions, as well as the connections across international institutions.

The challenges of trying to understand the interests, institutions, and information of actors in an international context are great, and much remains to be learned. The course is designed not just to familiarize students with institutional analysis, but also to stimulate their curiosity about questions that really have yet to be answered satisfactorily. An important goal of the course is also to the equip students with analytical tools to address such questions.

The course seeks to equip students with analytical tools helpful in identifying the winners and losers from globalization. Adding in a heavy dose of the study of democracy, the course builds on MSFS core courses – on the one hand – the trade and finance courses, and – on the other hand – the introduction to international relations.

A major focus of the course is to make sense of applied statistical analyses looking at the determinants and consequences of trade, finance, economic growth, democracy, and participation in international institutions. The course seeks to make students educated consumers of advanced statistical analyses so that they can

Course requirements are intended to help students develop the ability to serve as a "bridge" between the academic and policy worlds, where students can interpret sophisticated and technical studies and "translate" them for a broad, non-specialized audience.

Three written assignments and class participation will determine your grade. The course will follow the 3.5 class average mandated by the MSFS program. Note that A- = 3.7. So, the "expected" grade is less than A-.

One goal of the written assignments is to bridge social science research to a contemporary policy question. Another goal is to practice professional, powerful, concise writing skills. The due dates are provided below (next to each question).

ASSIGNMENT #1: POLICY MEMO (DUE Feb 18)
Propose a policy position on reforming one of the Bretton Woods Institutions (or any other inter-governmental organization of your choice). Write the memo from the perspective of a specific policy-maker within the country of your choice.
RECOMMENDED LENGTH: 500 WORDS

ASSIGNMENT #2: REPORT ON DEMOCRACY, BACKED UP BY DATA (DUE Mar 25)
Propose a factor that influences democratization. Justify why this factor matters with a logical (theoretical) argument. Test your theory using data. You may use as your base-line model specification, the model of Gassebner et al. (2013), a required reading listed below.
RECOMMENDED LENGTH: 500 WORDS + 1 page appendix presenting statistical results.
          Click here to download the Gassebner et al. (2013) Stata data file and Stata do-file.
(Don't worry. The statistical work will be easier than you think! I'll help you.)

ASSIGNMENT #3 (DUE Apr 28)
To be decided through class discussion.

Nota bene:
All short written assignments are due electronically by 10:15am on the date listed above at my email address: jrv24@georgetown.edu. I will not accept (grade) late assignments. Please double-space your documents and use 12-point font with (at least) 1 inch margins. Please be sure to familiarize yourself with Georgetown’s honor system.

Class 1: Institutional vs. Culturalist explanations

CLASS LECTURE NOTES (if any – available after the class session has taken place)

Readings:

• None
  Themes: What is culture? Does culture "explain"? What is "explanation"? Culture and institutions; General definition of "institution"; Domestic political institutions; International institutions

Class 2: International institutions and the Democratic Peace

CLASS LECTURE NOTES (if any – available after the class session has taken place)

Readings:

• Russett and Oneal: Triangulating peace – From WikiSummary, the Free Social Science Summary Database.
  
  
• Pevehouse, Jon C. 2002. Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization. International Organization 56:3:515-549.
  

Class 3: Why did we ever invent the International Monetary Fund?

CLASS LECTURE NOTES (if any – available after the class session has taken place)

Readings:

• Eichengreen, Barry. 1996. Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  PAGES 3-135
  
  
• Singer, David Andrew. 2010. Migrant Remittances and Exchange Rate Regimes in the Developing World. American Political Science Review 104 (2): 307-323.
  

Class 4: What are the IMF and the World Bank and what do they do?

CLASS LECTURE NOTES (if any – available after the class session has taken place)

Readings:

• Vreeland, James Raymond. 2007. The International Monetary Fund: Politics of Conditional Lending. New York: Routledge.
  CHAPTERS 1 (pp5-36) & 4 (pp73-94)

• The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)

• International Development Association (IDA)

• Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)

• International Finance Corporation (IFC)

Class 5: International institutions: What is the WTO and why promote free trade?

CLASS LECTURE NOTES (if any – available after the class session has taken place)

Readings:

• World Trade Organization, Information and Media Relations Division. 2008. Understanding the WTO. Geneva, Switzerland: WTO. SKIM entire
  Or in Spanish: Organización Mundial del Comercio, División de Información y Relaciones con los Medios de Comunicación. 2007. Entender la OMC. Ginebra, Suiza: OMC.

• Busch, Marc. Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade. International Organization 61(4): 735-761.

• Bohara, Alok K., Kishore Gawande and Pablo Sanguinetti. 2004. Trade Diversion and Declining Tariffs: Evidence from Mercosur. Journal of International Economics 64(1): 65-88.

Suggested further reading:

• Oatley, Thomas. 2010. International Political Economy (4th Edition) (Paperback). New York: Longman.
  CHAPTER 2 (pp21-45)
  
  
• Grieco, Joseph M. and John Ikenberry. 2003. The Economics of International Trade. In Grieco and Ikenberry, State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
  CHAPTER 2 (pp19-56).

Class 6: The historical legacy of an international institution: effects of the transatlantic slave-trade

CLASS LECTURE NOTES (if any – available after the class session has taken place)

Readings:

• Nunn, Nathan, and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa. American Economic Review 101 (7): 3221-52.
  
  
• Acharya, Avidit, Matthew Blackwell, and Maya Sen. 2013. The Political Legacy of American Slavery. Manuscript.

Class 7: Domestic political institutions: What is democracy?

CLASS LECTURE NOTES (if any – available after the class session has taken place)

Readings:

• Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political Regimes and Economic Well-being in the World, 1950-1990. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  CHAPTER 1

• Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited. Public Choice 143 (1-2):67-101.

Class 8: Where do domestic political institutions come from?

CLASS LECTURE NOTES (if any – available after the class session has taken place)

Readings:

• Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political Regimes and Economic Well-being in the World, 1950-1990. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  CHAPTER 2

• Boix, Carles and Susan C. Stokes. 2003. Endogenous Democratization. World Politics 55 (4): 517-549

• Gassebner, Martin, Michael J. Lamla, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2013. Extreme Bounds of Democracy. Journal of Conflict Resolution 57 (2): 171-197.

Class 9: Domestic political institutions and development: Do democracies grow differently than autocracies?

CLASS LECTURE NOTES (if any – available after the class session has taken place)

Readings:

• Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political Regimes and Economic Well-being in the World, 1950-1990. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  CHAPTER 3 (pp142-186)
  
  
• Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political Regimes and Economic Well-being in the World, 1950-1990. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  CHAPTER 5 (pp216-268)

Class 10: Do democracies trade more? Do they attract more investment?

CLASS LECTURE NOTES (if any – available after the class session has taken place)

Readings:

• Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2000. Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade. American Political Science Review 94 (2):305-321.
  
  
• Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. International Organization 56 (3):477-513.
  
  
• Jensen, Nathan M. 2003. Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment. International Organization 57 (3):587-616.

Class 11: Domestic political institutions and the IMF

CLASS LECTURE NOTES (if any – available after the class session has taken place)

Readings:

• Vreeland, James Raymond. 2007. The International Monetary Fund: Politics of Conditional Lending. New York: Routledge.
  CHAPTER 3 (pp50-72)
  
  
• Cho, Hye Jee. 2013. Impact of IMF Programs on Perceived Creditworthiness of Emerging Market Countries: Is There a “Nixon-Goes-to-China” Effect? International Studies Quarterly DOI: 10.1111/isqu.12063
  
  
• Broz, J. Lawrence. 2011. The United States Congress and IMF financing, 1944–2009. Review of International Organizations 6 (3-4): 341-368.

Class 12: Domestic/international political institutions and human rights

CLASS LECTURE NOTES (if any – available after the class session has taken place)

Readings:

• Hollyer, James R. and B. Peter Rosendorff. Forthcoming. Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Sign the Convention Against Torture? Signaling, Domestic Politics, and Non-Compliance. Quarterly Journal of Political Science.
  
  
• Also: Enjoy this fun blogging about the above paper! Be sure to read all the comments (Click here) - esp. the one I wrote ;) (Click here)
  
  
• Vreeland, James Raymond. 2008. Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture. International Organization 62 (1):65-101.


• Goodliffe, Jay and Darren Hawkins. 2006. Explaining Commitment: States and the Convention against Torture. Journal of Politics 68 (2):358–371.

Class 13: Governance across international institutions

CLASS LECTURE NOTES (if any – available after the class session has taken place)

Readings:

• Vreeland, James Raymond and Axel Dreher. 2014. Money and Politics and the International Stage: The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  CHAPTERS 1 & 5 (SEE "BLACKBOARD" FOR CHAPTER 5)
  
  
• Lim, Daniel Yew Mao and James Raymond Vreeland. 2013. Regional Organizations and International Politics: Japanese Influence over the Asian Development Bank and the UN Security Council. World Politics 65 (1): 34-72.

Class 14: Global governance: Who runs the international institutions? Why do we have a G-20? And what is the role of regional institutions?

CLASS LECTURE NOTES (if any – available after the class session has taken place)

Readings:

• Vreeland, James Raymond. 2007. The International Monetary Fund: Politics of Conditional Lending. New York: Routledge.
  CHAPTER 2 (pp37-49)
  
  
• Desai, Raj M. and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. Are Davos Man's Days Numbered? Up Front Blog, The Brookings Institution. January 26.
  
  
• McNamara, Kathleen R. 2008. A rivalry in the making? The Euro and international monetary power. International Political Economy 15 (3):439-459.

WE ARE GLOBAL GEORGETOWN!