Students visiting this page for the first time should read through the entire syllabus: the course description, the course requirements, and the course outline. Beyond this initial reading, this web-based syllabus is designed to be used throughout the semester. Below you will find links to the assignments for each class session. Where possible, reading assignments have been linked to electronic versions available on the Internet. Other readings can be found under the "Materials" section of the Yale "classes" server. You will also find many other useful items on the Yale classes server, such as class notes and data. If you have any questions or comments about the web page or the course, please contact me.
[ Course description ] [ Requirements ] [ Course Outline ] [ Contact Instructor ]
Sept. 19: Research question due
Oct. 24: Outline of research project due
Dec. 8: Draft of paper due
This year long senior seminar is the capstone of the International Studies Major. Students are expected to apply the skills and substantive knowledge they have acquired from the required courses of the major to do research on a question pertaining to international studies. The skills include the ability to do research in foreign languages, formal analytical tools from micro and macroeconomics, and statistical analysis.
This is a research-oriented seminar. It assumes that you have background and interest in a topic in international studies. The purpose of this course is to teach you how to conduct research in your area of interest. Thus, you should come to this class with a research question. This course provides the opportunity of in depth research on your question – with the assistance of your colleagues in the class.
The substantive topic for this senior seminar is international cooperation. This course addresses why governments enter into international arrangements and with what effects. We will study the effects of these arrangements on measures of material well-being such as economic growth and the environment. We will also look at the effect of international arrangements on measures of stability such as regime transition.
How does one assess the effectiveness of international arrangements? The answer eludes straightforward observation. What one observes in the world are not random experiments. Governments enter into international agreements under certain conditions. Outcomes are the result of both the effects of international arrangements and of these conditions. One must be able to identify what part of the outcome should be attributed to selection and what part to performance.
Hence, before answering questions about the effects of international agreements, we must first address the question of why governments enter into these agreements in the first place.
While the questions of selection and performance are interconnected and we will address both in this course, students may prefer to focus on a selection question (why governments enter into international arrangements) or focus on a performance question (what are the effects of international arrangements) for their research project. Projects may be broadly theoretical, or narrowly descriptive (or anything in between). Substantively, students may choose to focus on any number of different international arrangements (e.g., IMF or World Bank arrangements, alliances or treaties, or trade agreements such as the WTO). With permission, students may also pursue a research topic outside of the area of international arrangements, provided it fits within the broader framework of international studies.
We will approach research questions from 3 methodological perspectives:
(1) formal theory (2) large-n empirical work (3) case study empirical work.
• Students who have taken some game theory or formal modeling are encouraged to try their hand at formal approaches to research questions. (Recall what you learned in Econ 115 & 116.)
• Students who have statistical training are encouraged to do large-n empirical work. Data will be made available to the class. (Recall what you learned in Stat 102.)
• Students who prefer case study work should choose their cases analytically by considering different “types” of cases that a question identifies. Once the “type” of case is identified, the student can refer to data to learn which country exemplifies the type the student wishes to explore. (Here your linguistic skills can be used. Group courses also may be helpful.)
• Students interested in a particular country or region must also reference the larger database to gain an understanding of where their particular case lies in the broader distribution of cases. Such students should use the data set to identify other cases similar to the one that interests them, as well as counterfactual cases. (Language skills and Group courses.)
Week 1 (9/12/06): Introduction
PLAN OF RESEARCH:
• Start with a RESEARCH QUESTION
• Review the literature
• Propose an answer to your question
• Find the data
• Selection analytically significant cases
• Analysis of data
• Draw conclusions
How do we select case studies?
Vreeland, James Raymond. 2003. Why do governments and the IMF enter into agreements: Statistically selected case studies. International Political Science Review: Special Issue on The Political Economy of International Finance 24(3): 321-343.
Choose an analytically significant case with respect to your research
question. Explain why it is signficant.
Week 2 (9/19/06): The selection
problem in international relations
Vreeland, James Raymond.
Forthcoming. The IMF and Economic
Development. In William Easterly (ed.), Reinventing Foreign Aid. Cambridge:
MIT Press and Center for Global Development.
(available on class server)
Geddes, Barbara. 1990. “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics.” Political Analysis 2. Pages 131-152.
your research, do you face a selection problem? What are the potential
determinants of selection?
Week 3 (9/26/06): Why do governments enter into international arrangements?
Andrew. 2000. The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic
Delegation in Postwar Europe. International Organization 54: 217-52.
Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. International Organization 56: 477–513.
Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change. International Organization 52: 887–917
Hawkins, Darren and Jay Michael Goodliffe. 2006. Explaining Commitment: States and the Convention against Torture. Journal of Politics 68 (2): 358-371.
Form and Substance in International Agreements. The American Journal of
International Law Vol. 99, No. 3 (Jul., 2005), pp. 581-614.
Week 4 (10/3/06): Stata session on entering into international arrangements
CAT Selection: Why Governments enter into the UN Convention Against Torture.
Institutional Determinants of IMF Programs.
The International and Domestic Politics of IMF Programs.
ASSIGNMENT: Following on the
assignment from Week 2, test whether there is indeed a correlation
between the variable(s) you proposed and selection.
Week 5 (10/10/06): Foreign Aid
Easterly. Debt Relief. Foreign Policy, No. 127. (Nov. - Dec., 2001),
William Easterly. Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth? The Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer, 2003), pp. 23-48.
Karen L. Remmer. Does Foreign Aid Promote the Expansion of Government? American Journal of Political Science Vol. 48, No. 1 (Jan., 2004), pp. 77-92.
Alberto and David Dollar. Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?
Journal of Economic Growth, 5 (March 2000): 33–63.
Alesina and Beatrice Weder. Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign
Aid? The American Economic Review Vol. 92, No. 4 (Sep., 2002), pp.
Suggested background: Diamond, Jared. 1999. Guns, Germs, and Steel:
The Fates of Human Societies.
New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
(10/17/06): Stata session on the effects of international
Week 7 (10/24/06):International cooperation and human rights
Oona A. 2003. The Cost of Commitment. Stanford Law Review 55: 1821-62.
Emilie. 2005. Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements
Influence Government Repression.” International Organization 59(3):
CIRI Human Rights
M. Rodwan, and David Cingranelli. 2006. “The Human Rights Effects of
World Bank Structural Adjustment Lending, 1981-2000.” International
Studies Quarterly (June) 50: 233-262.
Oona. 2002. Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? The Yale Law
Journal 111: 1935-2042.
Week 8 (10/31/06): United Nations
Ilyana and Eric Werker. 2005. How Much is a Seat
on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United
Forthcoming at Journal of Political
Economy. Available on classes server.
Edward C. 2005. Reforming the Security Council-Step One: Improving
Working Methods. This background paper was prepared at the request of
the Swiss Government and its Permanent Mission to the United Nations
for discussions with Member States.
Edward C. 2006. The UN Security Council: Practice & Promise. New
David M. (2000) Eyes on the Prize: The Quest for Nonpermanent Seats on
the U.N. Security Council. Global Governance. 6 (1), Jan-Mar 2000: 3-24.
Eric. Why no UN Security Council Reform?: Lessons for and from
Soo Yeon and Bruce Russett. The New Politics of Voting Alignments in
the United Nations General Assembly. International Organization, Vol.
50, No. 4. (Autumn, 1996), pp. 629-652.
Week 9 (11/7/06): Nuclear Proliferation
Week 10 (11/14/06): Democracy,
Development, and Diffusion
Jon C. 2002a. With a Little Help from My Friends? Regional
Organizations and the Consolidation of Democracy.” American Journal of Political Science
Pevehouse, Jon C. 2002b. Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization. International Organization 56: 515–549.
Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1997. “Modernization: Theories and Facts.” World Politics 49. Pages 155-183.
Ward, Michael D., John O'Loughlin, Jordin S. Cohen, Kristian S. Gleditsch, David S. Brown, David A. Reilly, Corey L. Lofdahl, & Michael E. Shin. 1998. The Diffusion of Democracy, 1946-1994. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 88: 545-74.
Simmons, Beth and Zachary Elkins. 2004.The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy. American Political Science Review 98 (1): 171-189.
Week 11 (11/28/06): The IMF and the
James Raymond. 2007. The
Fund: Politics of Conditional Lending. New York:
William. 2002. The Elusive Quest
for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2002. Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
Week 12 (12/5/06): Setting the research agenda for next semester and review
Professor Vreeland's Contact
James Raymond Vreeland
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science
124 Prospect Street (Brewster Hall) - Room 305. For directions, use
Office hours: Tuesdays 10am-12pm *By appointment only - see
the sign up sheet on my office door*