International Ideas and Institutions: Contemporary Challenges (INTS 172b)
James Vreeland

This web-based syllabus is designed to be used throughout the semester. Below you will find links to the assignments for each of the 26 class sessions throughout the semester. Where possible, reading assignments have been linked to electronic versions available on the Internet. Otherwise, the assignment comes from a book available at the library and/or bookstore. Under the "materials" section of the class server, you will find the lecture notes for each session.

Students visiting this page for the first time should read through the entire syllabus: the course description, the course requirements, the reading and the course outline. If you have any questions or comments about the web page or the course, please contact me.

Contact Instructor  ]    [  Contact Teaching Assistants  ]
Course description  ]    [  Requirements  ]    [  Reading  ]    [  Course Outline  ]
Books on reserve and available at Book Haven  ]    [  Reading Packet  ]

Important Dates:
Monday, Feb. 14: 1st short response due
Wednesday, Mar. 23: Midterm Examination
Wednesday, Apr. 4: OPTIONAL 2nd short response due
Monday, May 2: Papers due by 4pm.

1. Introduction: What is the International Studies Major and how does it relate to the sub-field of International Relations in Political Science? (1/10/05)
2. How do political leaders make decisions? (1/12/05)
3. Can international institutions really make a difference in the way independent countries behave? (1/14/05)
4. Who controls international institutions? (1/19/05)
5. What is the IMF? (1/24/05)
6. Why do governments participate in IMF programs? (1/26/05)
7. Has the World Bank succeeded in promoting economic growth? What are the impacts of World Bank programs on human rights? (1/31/05)
8. Can international law be used to promote human rights? (2/2/05)
9. If international trade is so great, why isn't everyone a free trader? (2/7/05)
10. Does the WTO have any real power or is it simply a tool of the West? (2/9/05)
11. Why don't democracies wage war against one another? (2/14/05)
12. Is national identity shaped by international forces? (2/16/05)
13. Does the "democratic peace" extend to the question of civil war? (2/21/05)
14. Can cooperation at the international level influence regime change at the domestic level? (2/23/05)
15. Who wins and loses wars? (2/28/05)
16. Why are rich countries rich and poor countries poor? (3/2/05)
17. Can we really predict what will happen on the international stage, or is describing events the best we can do? (3/21/05)
18. Midterm examination ( (3/23/05)
19. How can deadly enemies find peace? 3/28/05)
20. Which states cooperate to protect the environment and why? (3/30/05)
21. When does terrorism work? (4/4/05)
22. Is oil a blessing or a curse? (4/6/05)
23. Why don't the poor soak the rich under democracy? (4/11/05)
24. If globalization is so important, why isn’t everyone behind it? (4/13/05)
25. How do global financial markets influence governments? (4/18/05)
26. Can individuals really change the world? (4/20/05)
 [Top]
 

Course description
This is the second part of the two-part course on international ideas and institutions. While the first part focused on the historical foundations of international studies, this semester addresses contemporary research questions in the field of international relations. The course is organized around questions that reflect both interesting international phenomena and curious puzzles that call for some kind of explanation. Various different and competing answers have been proposed to the questions we will address in this course. We will critically evaluate these answers and test whether their empirical implications are reflected by historical events. In addition to learning substantive answers to our research questions, students will be introduced different analytical tools useful in the study of international phenomena.

The questions we will address include: Why do countries go to war? What are the determinants of international trade and what are the effects? What is the role of international institutions such as the WTO, the World Bank, and the IMF? Students will learn that there are no clear-cut answers to these questions - experts disagree. Yet, the course will arm the students with several different approaches that can be employed to tackle these difficult questions. The approaches covered include normative, constructivist, realist, and liberal. Special attention is paid to the merits of a good explanation as well as questions of research design. What is an explanation? Keep this question in mind throughout the semester.
 [Top]

 

Requirements

(1) One or Two short responses (10% each): Take any question we pose in class and critically evaluate an answer to it. Maximum 2 pages. (1st response due Feb.14, 2005. OPTIONAL 2nd response due Apr. 4, 2005.)

(2) In-class Midterm examination (40%): Wednesday, Mar. 23, 2005.

(3) Final paper (40% or 50%): Take your short response (if you did two, take the one you like better) and examine the question more carefully. Do further research, comparing different approaches and explanations. Decide what you think is the best explanation and why. Suggestion: Write the paper as a research proposal for your senior essay. The paper should be 10 pages.
(Due: Monday, May 2, 2005.)
 [Top]
 

Reading
Students will typically be expected to read about 100 pages per lecture. Besides the required reading (in bold below), you will also find “recommended” and “background” reading. This is not required. It is provided for motivated students who wish to explore various issues in greater depth. Also, it may prove useful as additional research for class papers. Some readings are available on-line. URLs are provided below. Other readings are available on reserve at the library and available for purchase at Book Haven.
 [Top]
 

Course Outline

1. What is the International Studies Major and how does it relate to the sub-field of International Relations in Political Science? (1/10/05)

International Studies is the interdisciplinary approach to explaining international phenomena. International Studies programs may address any question that has an international or global dimension. International Studies scholars employ approaches from across the social sciences and some employ approaches from the humanities and the sciences. Scholars of International Relations in the sub-field of Political Science, on the other hand, study questions relating to war, trade, international institutions, and international cooperation. Political Scientists, of course, also study other questions cross-national in scope, such as democratization, development, and revolution, but they usually do so in the sub-fields of Comparative Politics or Political Economy. So, International Studies tends to be broader in scope - especially with respect to the topics covered - than any single sub-field in Political Science. The two disciplines do have much in common, however, especially with respect to the interdisciplinary nature of the approaches employed. Unlike other disciplines, political science does not have a core set of tools of its own that all political scientists use. Instead, Political Scientists borrow tools from other disciplines such as economics, history, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and others. So while this class is an introduction to International Studies from the perspective of Political Science, we will study research from fields across the social sciences. In this sense, the Political Science perspective follows very closely the spirit of International Studies. Nevertheless, the fact that this course is taught by a Political Scientist will be clear throughout the semester. In this lecture, we will go over the questions that we will address throughout the semester.
  [Top]
 

2. How do political leaders make decisions? (1/12/05)

Required:
Katzenstein, Peter J.; Robert O. Keohane; Stephen D. Krasner. 1998. International Organization and the Study of World Politics. International Organization 52(4): 645-685.
***Available on-line at www.jstor.org***

Keohane, Robert. After Hegemony. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1 & 2.
***Book available at Book Haven and on reserve at CCL***

In International Relations (the sub-field of Political Science), scholars tend to approach questions from different perspectives such as Realist, Liberal and Contructivist. Each of these perspectives make assumptions (sometimes implicit assumptions) about why political leaders make the decisions that they do. Which perspective seems most persuasive to you? What are the implications about leaders' behavior according to each perspective? How do our assumptions in political science about what drives leaders differ from the standard assumptions that economists make about what drives individuals behavior when interacting in markets?

Recommended:
Przeworski, Adam. 2003. States and Markets: A Primer in Political Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 5.
 [Top]

 

3. Can international institutions really make a difference in the way independent countries behave? (1/14/05)

Required:
Chayes, Abram and Anotonia Handler Chayes. 1993. On Compliance. International Organization: 175-205.
***Available on-line at www.jstor.org***

Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation? International Organization 50: 379-406.
***Available on-line at www.jstor.org***

Chayes and Chayes, who are professors of international law, suggest that high rates of compliance with international law indicate that international law is effective. Furthermore, they blame non-compliance on laws that are too strict, not on the well-intentioned governments who have signed on to international law. How do political scientists Downs, Rocke and Barsoom disagree? What exactly is the selection problem that they suggest?

Recommended:
Simmons, Beth A. 2000. International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs. American Political Science Review 94: 819-835.
***Available on-line at www.jstor.org***

Von Stein, Jana. Forthcoming. Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance. American Political Science Review.

Vreeland, J. R. 2003. The IMF and Economic Development. New York: Cambridge University Press. CHAPTER 5.
  [Top]
 

4. Who controls international institutions? (1/19/05)

Required:
Vaubel, Roland. 1996. "Bureaucracy at the IMF and the World Bank: A Comparison of the Evidence." World Economy 19 (2): 195-210.
***Available on-line from EbsoHost***

Babb, Sarah and Ariel Buira. 2004. Mission Creep, Mission Push and Discretion in Sociological Perspective: The Case of IMF Conditionality. Paper presented at the XVIII G24 Technical Group Meeting, March 8-9, 2004, Geneva, Switzerland.
***Available on-line at www.g24.org***

In previous lectures we have discussed the view that international institutions exist merely to pursue the ends of their most powerful members. Contrary to this view, we read two pieces for today that both suggest that control of international bureaucracies is not so straightforward. We will learn about a power analytical tool that can be applied well beyond questions pertaining to International Studies: the Principal-Agent problem. Note that while the authors of the two readings for today largely agree, they approach their research from different disciplines: economics and sociology. How does their research differ as a result?

Recommended for those who want to pursue the Principal-Agent problem:
Macho-Stadler, Ines, and David Perez-Castrillo. 1997. An Introduction to the Economics of Information. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  [Top]
 

5. What is the IMF? (1/24/05)

Required:
Vreeland, J.R. Forthcoming. The International Monetary Fund: Politics of Conditional Lending. London: Routledge. CHAPTER 1.
***Available through the class server***

Vreeland, James Raymond. 2003. The IMF and Economic Development. New York: Cambridge University Press. CHAPTERS 1 & 7.
***Book available at Book Haven and on reserve at CCL***

In this class we learn about the first of several international institutions that we will study throughout the semester, the IMF. Later we will study the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization, as well as other less well known international institutions and agreements.

Recommended:
McQuillan, Lawrence J., and Peter C. Montgomery. 1999. The International Monetary Fund, Financial Medic to the World? A Primer on Mission, Operations, and Public Policy Issues. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.
  [Top]
 

6. Why do governments participate in IMF programs? (1/26/05)

Required:
Vreeland, James Raymond. 2004. The International and Domestic Politics of IMF Programs. Paper prepared for the Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee and World Economic Forum conference on The Fund’s Role in Emerging Markets: Reassessing the Adequacy of its Resources and Lending Facilities. Amsterdam, November 18-19, 2004, De Nederlandsche Bank, Westeinde 1.
***Available on the class server***

Vreeland, James Raymond. 2003. The IMF and Economic Development. New York: Cambridge University Press. CHAPTER 2.
***Book available at Book Haven and on reserve at CCL***

People typically expect countries to turn to International Financial Institutions (IFIs) when they are in desperate need for a loan of foreign exchange. Yet, economic factors tell only part of the story. IFIs are inherently political. Politics at both the international and the domestic levels influence which countries turn to them and under what conditions. This class allows us to explore the ways in which politics at the international level influence politics at the domestic level and vice versa. The interaction of international and domestic politics is made explicit in the reading for today on the IMF.

Recommended:
Gourevitch, Peter. 1978. “The Second Image Reversed: the International Sources of Domestic Politics.” International Organization, vol. 32, no. 4, (Autumn), pp. 881-912.
***Available on-line at www.jstor.org***
Putnam, Robert D. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization 42: 427-60.
***Available on-line at www.jstor.org***
[Top]

 

7. Has the World Bank succeeded in promoting economic growth? (1/31/05)

Required:
Easterly, William. 2002. The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. ***CHAPTERS 3, 6, 10, 11***
***Book available at Book Haven and on reserve at CCL***

SUGGESTED:
Abouharb, M. Rodwan and David L. Cingranelli. 2003. Money Talks? The Impact of World Bank Structural Adjustment Lending on Human Rights, 1981-2000. Paper prepared for delivery at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August 28-31.

We move now to the World Bank. William Easterly served as an economist at the World Bank and recounts some very telling stories of his experiences there. How as the World Bank fared in the quest to promote economic development? How does this compare to the record of the IMF? What does Easterly suggest can be done better? Note that Easterly suggests the importance of promoting economic development not just because it is intrinsically important, but because many other important factors also improve with increased economic growth. Cingranelli and Abouharb look directly, however, at the impact of World Bank programs on government respect for human rights. What do they find?

 [Top]


8. Can international law be used to promote human rights? (2/2/05)

Required:
Hathaway, Oona A. 2003. The Cost of Commitment. Stanford Law Review 55: 1821-62.
***Available on-line at www.heinonline.org***

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. Forthcoming. Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression. International Organization.
***Available on-line***

Last class, we began looking at the determinants of government respect for human rights. Now we look specifically at the influence that international agreements may have in this area.

Background:
Hathaway, Oona. 2002. Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? The Yale Law Journal 111: 1935-2042.
 [Top]

 

9. If international trade is so great, why isn't everyone a free trader? (2/7/05)

Required:
Milner, Helen and B. Peter Rosendorff. 1997. Democratic Politics and International trade Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government as Constraints on Trade Liberalization. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(1): 117-147.
***Available on-line at www.jstor.org***

Mansfield, Edward, Helen Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2000. Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies and International Trade Negotiations. American Political Science Review 94(2): 305-322.
***Available on-line at www.jstor.org***

Last class, we began to look at the effects that preferential trade agreements may have on human rights. This class we take a step back and ask where such agreements come from in the first place, and why.

  [Top]
 

10. Does the WTO have any real power or is it simply a tool of the West? (2/9/05)

Required:
McGillivray, Fiona. 2000. Democratizing the World Trade Organization. Hoover Institution Policy Paper No 105.
***Available on-line at www-hoover.stanford.edu***

Eric Reinhardt. 2001. Adjudication without Enforcement in GATT Disputes. Journal of Conflict Resolution 45: 174-195.
***Available at jcr.sagepub.com***

Now we look at the free trade agreement with the largest membership: the World Trade Organization.
 
 [Top]
 

***Monday, Feb. 14: 1st short response due***

11. Why don't democracies wage war against one another? (2/14/05)

Required:
Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett. 1993. Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986. American Political Science Review 87(3): 624-638.
***Available on-line at www.jstor.org***

Gowa, Joanne. 1995. Democratic States and International Disputes. International Organization 49(3): 511-522.
***Available on-line at www.jstor.org***

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce; James D. Morrow; Randolph M. Siverson; and Alastair Smith. 1999. An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace. American Political Science Review 93(4): 791-807.
***Available on-line at www.jstor.org***

We learned in our studies of international trade that democracies are more likely to trade with each other than other regimes are. We learn in this class that this may have further implications. There appear to be numerous positive externalities from democracies. In particular, democracies have never been observed to go to war with one another. This phenomenon has come to be known as the "democratic peace." We explore various explanations of this phenomenon.

Further reading:
See Professor Russett's (Yale University) syllabus for his course on this subject.

 [Top]
 


12. Is national identity shaped by international forces? (2/16/05)

Darden, Keith A. 2004. A First Mover Advantage in National Culture: Mass Schooling and the Origins of Nationalism in the USSR. Ms.
***Available under MATERIALS on the class server***

 [Top]



13. Does the "democratic peace" extend to the question of civil war? (2/21/05)

Required:
Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis. Forthcoming. Making War and Building Peace: The United Nations since the 1990’s. Princeton: Princeton University Press. CHAPTER 2.
***Available on-line***

Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis. Forthcoming. Making War and Building Peace: The United Nations since the 1990’s. Princeton: Princeton University Press. CHAPTER 3.
***Available on-line***

Gandhi, Jennifer and James Vreeland. 2004. Political Institutions and Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy. Ms.
***Available on-line***

We move now from international war to civil war, and explore whether or not there are political institutions that are more or less likely to lead to civil war. Do political institutions influence the likelihood of civil war or do economic factors dominate?
  [Top]
 

14. Can cooperation at the international level influence regime change at the domestic level? (2/23/05)

Required:
Pevehouse Jon C. 2002. With a Little Help from My Friends? Regional Organizations and the Consolidation of Democracy.” American Journal of Political Science 46(3): 611-26.
***Available on-line at www.jstor.org***

We have explored the connections between international level politics and domestic level politics earlier in the semester. In this class, we will study whether international organizations can have an impact on domestic political regime change and consolidation.

Background:
Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political Regimes and Economic Well-being in the World, 1950-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2002. All International Politics Is Local: The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
 [Top]
 

15. Who wins and loses wars? (2/28/05)

Required:
Stam, Allan C. 1996. Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. CHAPTERS 6 & 2 ***PLUS PAGES 176-181***.
***Book available at Book Haven and on reserve at CCL***

Continuing our study of the connections between political regime and war, we learn in this class that regime-type is not just a determinant of who goes to war, but also who wins them.
[Top]

 

16. Why are rich countries rich and poor countries poor? (3/2/05)

Required:
Diamond, Jared. 1999. Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. PAGES 33-265.
***Book available at Book Haven and on reserve at CCL***

Recommended:
Hibbs, Douglass and Ola Olsson. 2004. Geography, Biogeography and Why Some Countries Are Rich and Others Poor. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States. (PNAS), vol. 101, No. 10, 2004, 3715-3740.
[Top]

***Spring Break***


17. Can we really predict what will happen on the international stage, or is describing events the best we can do? (3/21/05)

NO REQUIRED READING. A GIFT BEFORE THE MID-TERM. STUDY HARD.

Back ground:
Przeworski, Adam and Henry Teune. 1982. The Logic of Comparative Inquiry. Malebar, Florida: Krieger Publishing. Pages 3-30.
[Top]


18. ***Midterm examination*** (3/23/05)


19. How can deadly enemies find peace? (3/28/05)

Required:
Fortna, Virginia Page. 2004. Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press. CHAPTERS 1, 5 & 6.
***Book available at Book Haven and on reserve at CCL***

Having spent several classes on the questions of war and political regime, we now turn to the question of peace. In particular, we ask whether there are international arrangements that can improve the longevity and durability of peace.
[Top]

20. Which states cooperate to protect the environment and why? (3/30/05)

Required:
Sprinz, Detlef and Tapani Vaahtoranta. 1994. The Interest-Based Explanation of International Environmental Policy. International Organization 48: 77-105.
***Available on-line at www.jstor.org***

Haas, Peter M. 1992. Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone. International Organization 46: 187-224.
***Available on-line at www.jstor.org***

Young, Oran R. 1989. The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural Resources and the Environment. International Organization 43: 349-75.
***Available on-line at www.jstor.org***
 [Top]

 
21. When does terrorism work? (4/4/05)

Required:
Pape, Robert A. 2003. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. American Political Science Review 97(3): 343-361.
***Available on-line at journals.cambridge.org***

Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. Forthcoming. The Quality of Terror. American Journal of Political Science.
***Available on-line***
 [Top]

  ***OPTIONAL 2nd response due Apr. 4, 2005***

22. Is oil a blessing or a curse? (4/6/05)

Required:
Ross. Michael. 1999. The Political Economy of the Resource Curse. World Politics 51: 297-322.
***Available on-line***

Jensen, Nathan and Leonard Wantchekon. Forthcoming. Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa. Comparative Political Studies.
***Available on-line***
 [Top]

 

23. Why don't the poor soak the rich under democracy? (4/11/05)

Required:
Shapiro, Ian. 2003.The State of Democratic Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 5.
This reading is available on the "classes" server under "Materials." The file is called StateOfDemTheory.pdf.
 [Top]

 

24. If globalization is so important, why isn’t everyone behind it? (4/13/05)

Required:
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2002. Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. PAGES ***TBA***
***Book available at Book Haven and on reserve at CCL***

Vreeland, James Raymond. 2003. The IMF and Economic Development. New York: Cambridge University Press. CHAPTERS 6.
***Book available at Book Haven and on reserve at CCL***
 
[Top]

 

25. How do global financial markets influence governments? (4/18/05)

Required:
Mosley, Layna. 2003. Global Capital and National Governments.  New York: Cambridge University Press, CHAPTER ***TBA***
***Book available at Book Haven and on reserve at CCL***

Recommended:
Garrett, Geoffrey. 1998. Partisan Politics in the Global Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Eichengreen, Barry. 1996. Globalizing Capital. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
 [Top]

 

26. Can individuals really change the world? (4/20/05)
 [Top]
 

***Monday, May 2, 2005: Papers due by 4pm.***
***Location: 124 Prospect Street***
 

Books on reserve and available at the Book Haven:

Keohane, Robert. After Hegemony. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Vreeland, James Raymond. 2003. The IMF and Economic Development. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Easterly, William. 2002. The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Stam, Allan C. 1996. Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Fortna, Virginia Page. 2004. Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Diamond, Jared. 1999. Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Mosley, Layna. 2003. Global Capital and National Governments.  New York: Cambridge University Press.

Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2002. Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
 [Top]

 

Reading Packet

NO READING PACKET REQUIRED FOR THIS COURSE. ALL ARTICLES ARE AVAILABLE ON-LINE :)
BUT SOME BOOKS ARE NOT. SEE ABOVE :(

[Top]
 

Contact Instructor:
James Raymond Vreeland
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science
email: james.vreeland@yale.edu
web: http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/jrv24/
tel: 203-432-6220

Office hours: Wednesday afternoons (3-5pm)
Office location: 124 Prospect Street, Room 305. Click here for directions.
 [Top]
 

Contact Graders:

Sarina Steinbarth
sarina.steinbarth@yale.edu

Tiffani Brown
tiffani.brown@yale.edu

Kyla Brooke
kyla.brooke@yale.edu

Sara Binensztok
sara.binensztok@yale.edu

Satkartar Khalsa
satkartar.khalsa@yale.edu


 [Top]