International Organization (Course number POL 550)
Classroom location:
Bendheim Hall 317
Class day & time: Wednesday, 1:30-4:20pm
This web-syllabus is designed to be used throughout the semester. Below you will find links to the readings for each of the 12 class sessions. Students visiting this page for the first time should read through the entire syllabus: the course description, the course requirements, and the course outline. If you have any questions or comments about the web page or the course, please contact me.
Course Description
Requirements
Sep 1: Introduction
Sep 8: The IMF
Sep 15: The World Bank
Sep 22: The WTO
Sep 29: Regional versions of the BWI's
Oct 6: The EU
Oct 13: The United Nations – General Assembly and Security Council
Oct 27: The United Nations – peacekeeping missions and human rights treaties
Nov 3: Institutional design and proliferation
Nov 10: International courts and the enforcement of international law
Nov 17: Rising Chinese institutions
Dec 1: Nationalism versus International Organizations
Course Description:
What are International Organizations (IOs) and what role do they play in world politics? In this course we will study various IOs, considering their historical origins, ostensible functions, the international and domestic political forces that impact their operations, and their effectiveness.
We will begin the course by addressing some overarching theoretical and methodological issues so that we have a core set of analytical tools we can apply to our study of specific IOs. From a theoretical perspective, we will consider various paradigms, such as realist, liberal, bureaucratic, and constructivist. From a methodological point of view, we will be concerned with questions of endogeneity and non-random selection. That is, separating the circumstances under which IOs take action from the inherent effects of their actions.
Delving into specific IOs, we begin with the Bretton Woods institutions: the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO. We then turn to regional versions of these institutions as well as the European Union. Next, we study the United Nations (General Assembly, Security Council, human rights, and peacekeeping operations). As we close out the semester, we turn to broader themes, such as the design of international institutions, international courts and the enforcement of international law, and the changing landscape of international organizations as emerging markets – mainly China – assert themselves as bigger players on the international stage.
The challenges of trying to understand the interests, institutions, and information of actors in an international context are great, and much remains to be learned. The course is designed not just to familiarize students with IOs, but also to stimulate their curiosity about questions that really have yet to be answered satisfactorily. An important goal of the course is to equip students with the analytical tools required to address such questions and pursue their own publishable research.
Requirements:
The course has four basic requirements: (1) participation as a paper presenter, (2) participation as a discussant, (3) ungraded short writing assignments, and (4) a paper.
(1) Participation as a paper presenter (25%):
I would like to run the first part of each class like an APSA panel. Each paper will be presented by one student – with slides – and a 9 minute time limit. There will be about 6 papers each week, so this should take an hour.
Why are we going to do this? Distilling the essential parts of a paper is a skill. Many scholars don't have it. This is why many presentations are unfocused and go over time. In this course, you are going to master the short presentation. This skill will serve you well. You can expect to present many papers – almost one per week. We are going to have fun with this aspect of the course, and you're going to leave this class as an expert presenter!
(2) Participation as a discussant (25%):
After the presentations, we'll take a break. Then we'll do the "discussant" part of the class. Each class we will select one student to present a "discussion" of the week's papers. This part of the class will be less structured. Students will be encouraged to pose questions and make suggestions. The discussion should highlight critiques of the week's readings – and offer constructive ideas to pursue in future research projects.
(3) Ungraded short writing assignments (10% – students are required to submit assignments each week for credit, but the content is ungraded):
Short assignments are designed to help you build toward your final paper. The key to good writing is writing a lot – without anxiety. And the key to writing a long paper is putting together a series of components of a paper. So, the short assignments will be (1) weekly, (2) ungraded, and (3) pertain to various aspects of your eventual long paper: the question, the literature, your theory, your method, your analysis, and your results.
The main requirement here is to submit evidence of progress on the final paper each week. Students are welcome to re-submit the same aspect of their paper multiple times with additional development. Below, I propose a series of assignments that may be useful to follow. But as a student's specific project unfolds, it may make sense to deviate from this proposed plan.
Short writing assignments:
1. The research question: What is your primary dependent variable of interest? (What are you explaining?) What is your primary independent variable of interest? (What do you hypothesize does the explaining?) (1-2 pages, double-spaced)
2. Preliminary bibliography: Read 100 abstracts. Make a list of at least 20 academic articles related to your research. (But you don't have to read/study them yet.)
3. Data: What are the, respective, means, medians, standard deviations, minimum values, and maximum values of your main dependent and independent variables? What are the sources of these data? What is the unit of observation (e.g., country-year)? How many observations do you have of each variable? (1-2 pages, double-spaced)
4. Annotated bibliography: Go back to the (at least) 20 academic articles related to your research. Provide a summary sentence linking the main finding of the article to your specific project.
5. Merging data: What is the correlation between your independent and dependent variables?
6. Baseline specification: What other factors (control variables) influence your dependent variable? Multivariate regression: Just do it. (Also provide a data table with the descriptive statistics for the full set of variables for your study.)
7. Abstract: You should have one sentence for each of the following (in this order):(1) Research question, (2) Hypothesis, (3) Methodology, (4) Result, (5) Conclusion (total: 150 words)
8. Put it together: String the best of the above assignments together and write a first draft: (1) abstract, (2) introduction, (3) background (remember the annotated bibliography?) (4) your argument/theory (5) descriptive data, (6) multivariate results, (7) conclusion
9. Make revisions: Revise/improve your draft.
***Due Date for final paper: TBD***
Note that there are 9 assignments listed, but we have 12 weeks of class. That's because some assignments will take more than one try :-)
All short written assignments are due electronically by 10am on Wednesday before class. Please upload them to Canvas. Assignments should be double-spaced with 12-point font and (at least) 1 inch margins.
(4) A paper.
The paper can be co-authored and all papers (co- or single-authored) will be held to the same standard. One approach is extending a replication of previously published research.
Course Outline
Sept 1: Introduction
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Abbot, Kenneth and Duncan Snidal. 1998. Why States Act through Formal Organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution 42:3-32.
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Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation? International Organization 50 (3):379-406.
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Von Stein, Jana. 2005. Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance. American Political Science Review 99 (4):611-622.
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Hurd, Ian. 1999. Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics. International Organization 53 (2):379-408.
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Mearsheimer, John. 1994. The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security winter 1994/95: 5-49.
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READ ***all 5*** of the short rejoinders to Mearsheimer (1994 - above) in International Security 20 (1, Summer 1995) by Robert Keohane & Lisa Martin, Charles Kupchan & Clifford Kupchan, John Ruggie, Alexander Wendt, and John Mearsheimer.
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Mearsheimer, John J. 2019. Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order. International Security 43 (4):7-50.
Sept 8: The IMF
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Nooruddin, Irfan and Joel W. Simmons. 2006. The Politics of Hard Choices: IMF Programs and Government Spending. International Organization 60 (4):1001-1033.
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Caraway, Teri L., Stephanie J. Rickard, and Mark S. Anner. 2012. International Negotiations and Domestic Politics: The Case of IMF Labor Market Conditionality. International Organization 66 (1): 27-61.
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Woo, Byungwon and Amanda Murdie. 2017. International Organizations and Naming and Shaming: Does the International Monetary Fund Care about the Human Rights Reputation of Its Client? Political Studies 65(4): 767-785.
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Cho, Hye Jee. 2014. Impact of IMF Programs on Perceived Creditworthiness of Emerging Market Countries: Is There a "Nixon-Goes-to-China" Effect? International Studies Quarterly 58 (2): 308-321.
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Chapman, Terrence, Songying Fang, Xin Li, and Randall W. Stone. 2015. Mixed Signals: IMF Lending and Capital Markets. British Journal of Political Science 47 (2): 329-349.
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Lipscy, Phillip Y. and Haillie Na-Kyung Lee. 2019. The IMF As a Biased Global Insurance Mechanism: Asymmetrical Moral Hazard, Reserve Accumulation, and Financial Crises. International Organization 73 (1): 35-64.
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Gould, Erica R. 2003. Money Talks: Supplementary Financiers and International Monetary Fund Conditionality. International Organization 57 (3):551-586.
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Broz, J. Lawrence. 2011. The United States Congress and IMF financing, 1944-2009. Review of International Organizations 6 (3):341-368.
Sept 15: The World Bank
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Frey, Bruno S. and Friedrich Schneider. 1986. Competing Models of International Lending Activity. Journal of Development Economics 20 (3):225-245.
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Nielson, Daniel L., Michael J. Tierney, and Catherine E. Weaver. 2006. Bridging the rationalist-constructivist divide: re-engineering the culture of the World Bank. Journal of International Relations and Development 9:107-139.
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Harrigan, Jane, Chengang Wang, and Hamed El-Said. 2006. The economic and political determinants of IMF and World Bank lending in the Middle East and North Africa. World Development 34 (2):247-270.
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Kersting, Erasmus K. and Christopher Kilby. 2016. With a little help from my friends: Global electioneering and World Bank lending. Journal of Development Economics 121:153-165.
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Malik, Rabia and Randall W. Stone. 2018. Corporate Influence in World Bank Lending. Journal of Politics 80 (1)103-118.
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Clark, Richard and Lindsay Dolan. 2021. Pleasing the Principal: U.S. Influence in World Bank Policymaking. American Journal of Political Science. 65 (1): 36-51.
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Clark, Richard. 2021. Pool or Duel? Cooperation and Competition Among International Organizations. International Organization https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818321000229.
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Abouharb, M. Rodwan, and David Cingranelli. 2006. The Human Rights Effects of World Bank Structural Adjustment Lending, 1981-2000. International Studies Quarterly 50 (2):233-62.
Sept 22: The WTO
Sept 29: Regional versions of the BWI's
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Kilby, Christopher. 2006. Donor influence in multilateral development banks: The case of the Asian Development Bank. Review of International Organizations 1 (2):173-195.
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Lim, Daniel Yew Mao and James Raymond Vreeland. 2013. Regional organizations and international politics: Japanese influence over the Asian Development Bank and the UN Security Council. World Politics 65 (1):34-72.
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Lipscy, Phillip Y. 2003. Japan's Asian Monetary Fund Proposal. Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 3 (1):93-104.
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Mansfield, Edward D. and Eric Reinhardt. 2003. Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Agreements. International Organization 57(4): 829-862.
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Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. International Organization 56 (3):477-513.
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Busch, Marc L. 2007. Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade. International Organization 61 (4):735-761.
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Bohara, Alok K., Kishore Gawande and Pablo Sanguinetti. 2004. Trade Diversion and Declining Tariffs: Evidence from Mercosur. Journal of International Economics 64(1): 65-88.
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Pratt, Tyler. 2021. Angling for Influence: Institutional Proliferation in Development Banking. International Studies Quarterly 65 (1):95-108.
Oct 6: The EU
Oct 1: The United Nations – General Assembly and Security Council
Oct 27: The United Nations – peacekeeping missions and human rights treaties
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Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis. 2000. International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis. American Political Science Review 94 (4):779-801.
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Fortna, Virginia Page. 2004. Interstate peacekeeping: Causal mechanisms and empirical effects. World Politics 56 (4):481-519.
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Howard, Lise Morjé and Anjali Kaushlesh Dayal. 2018. The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping. International Organization 72 (1):1-33.
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Hollyer, James R. and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2011. Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Sign the Convention Against Torture? Signaling, Domestic Politics, and Non-Compliance. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 6: 275-327.
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Conrad, Courtenay R. and Emily Hencken Ritter. 2013. Treaties, Tenure, and Torture: The Conflicting Domestic Effects of International Law. Journal of Politics 75 (2):397-409.
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Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Edward D. Mansfield, and Jon C.W. Pevehouse. 2013. Human Rights Institutions, Sovereignty Costs and Democratization. British Journal of Political Science 45 (1):1-27.
Nov 3: Institutional design and proliferation
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Koremenos, Barbara. 2005. Contracting around International Uncertainty. American Political Science Review 99 (4):549-565.
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Copelovitch, Mark S. and Tonya L. Putnam. 2014. Design in Context: Existing International Agreements and New Cooperation. International Organization 68(2):471-493.
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Johnson, Tana. 2017. Organizational Progeny. New York: Oxford University Press. CHAPTER 1 (page 1-26).
***UNDER "RESERVES" ON Canvas***
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Abbott, Kenneth W., Jessica F. Green, and Robert O. Keohane. 2016. Organizational Ecology and Institutional Change in Global Governance. International Organization 70 (2): 247-277.
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Bush, Sarah Sunn and Jennifer Hadden. 2019. Density and Decline in the Founding of International NGOs in the United States. International Studies Quarterly 63 (4):1133-1146.
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Hahm, Hyeonho, Thomas Konig, Moritz Osnabrugge, and Elena Frech. 2019. Who Settles Disputes? Treaty Design and Trade Attitudes Toward the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). International Organization 73 (4):881-900.
Nov 10: International courts and the enforcement of international law
Nov 17: Rising Chinese institutions
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Broz, J. Lawrence, Zhiwen Zhang, and Gaoyang Wang. Forthcoming. Explaining Foreign Support for China's Global Economic Leadership. International Organization 74 (3):417-452.
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Bunte, Jonas B. 2019. Raise the Debt: How Developing Countries Choose Their Creditors. New York: Oxford University Press. CHAPTER 1 (pages 1-29).
***UNDER "RESERVES" ON Canvas***
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Stone, Randall W., Yu Wang, and Shu Yu. 2021. Chinese Power and the State-Owned Enterprise. International Organization https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818321000308.
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Darden, Keith A. 2009. Economic Liberalism and Its Rivals: The Formation of International Institutions among the Post-Soviet States. New York: Cambridge University Press. CHAPTER 1 (pages 3-22).
***UNDER "RESERVES" ON Canvas***
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Tierney, Michael J. 2014. Rising Powers and the Regime for Development Finance. International Studies Review 16 (3):452-455.
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Donno, Daniela and Nita Rudra. 2014. To Fear or Not to Fear? BRICs and the Developing World. International Studies Review 16 (3):447-452.
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Lipscy, Phillip Y. 2017. Renegotiating the World Order: Institutional Change in International Relations. New York: Cambridge University Press. CHAPTER 1 (pages 1-22).
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Pratt, Tyler. 2018. Deference and Hierarchy in International Regime Complexes. International Organization 72 (3):561-590.
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Johns, Leslie, Krzysztof J. Pelc, and Rachel L. Wellhausen. 2019. How a Retreat from Global Economic Governance May Empower Business Interests. Journal of Politics 81 (2):731-738.
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Qian, Jing, James Raymond Vreeland, and Jianzhi Zhao. 2021. The Impact of China's AIIB on the World Bank. Manuscript, Princeton University.
Dec 1: Nationalism versus International Organizations
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Pevehouse, Jon C. 2002. Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization. International Organization 56:3:515-549.
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Donno, Daniela. 2010. Who Is Punished? Regional Intergovernmental Organizations and the Enforcement of Democratic Norms. International Organization 64 (4):593-625.
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Pevehouse, Jon C. and Mark Copelovitch. 2019. International organizations in a new era of populist nationalism. Review of International Organizations 14:169-186.
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Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. and Christina J Schneider. 2019. The Dark Side of Cooperation: International Organizations and Member Corruption. International Studies Quarterly 63 (4):1108-1121.
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Dolan, Lindsay R. 2018. Labeling Laggards and Leaders: International Organizations and the Politics of Defining Development. Manuscript available through https://lindsayrdolan.com/research.
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Cruz, Cesi and Christina J. Schneider. 2016. Foreign Aid and Undeserved Credit Claiming. American Journal of Political Science 61 (2):396-408.
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Madsen, Mikael Rask, Juan Mayoral, Anton Strezhnev, and Erik Voeten. 2020. Substance over Procedural Sovereignty: Why Authoritarians and Nationalists Oppose European Courts. Manuscript presented at GRIPE: Global Research in International Political Economy.
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Evelyne Hubscher, Thomas Sattler, Markus Wagner. 2021. Voters and the IMF: Experimental Evidence From European Crisis Countries. Manuscript.
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