This web-syllabus is designed to be used throughout the semester. Below you will find links to the readings for each of the 13 class sessions. Where possible, reading assignments have been linked to electronic versions available on the Internet. Otherwise, the assignment is available at the library and the bookstore. Students visiting this page for the first time should read through the entire syllabus: the course description, the course requirements, and the course outline. If you have any questions or comments about the web page or the course, please contact me.
What are International Organizations (IOs) and what role do they play in world politics? In this course we will take a political-economy approach to understanding various IOs, considering their historical origins, ostensible functions, the international and domestic political forces that impact their operations, and their effectiveness.
We will begin the course by addressing some overarching theoretical and methodological issues so that we have a core set of analytical tools we can apply to our study of specific IOs. From a theoretical perspective, we will consider various paradigms, such as realist, liberal, bureaucratic, and constructivist. From a methodological point of view, we will be concerned with questions of endogeneity and non-random selection. That is, separating the circumstances under which IOs take action from the inherent effects of their actions.
Delving into specific IOs, we begin with the International Financial Institutions (the IMF and the World Bank). We then turn to the United Nations (Security Council, Human Rights, Peacekeeping Operations). We subsequently analyze IOs dealing with Europe (NATO, EU). Next we consider international trade organizations (the GATT/WTO and regional trade organizations). We end the semester by considering some broad themes regarding IOs, specifically the effects that they may have on the promotion of democracy and on how democratically (or not) they are governed themselves. If the class expresses interest in specific IOs not currently on the syllabus, there may be some flexibility to introduce them.
As we examine each institution, we will keep several questions in mind:
Does this international organization represent anything more than the interests of its most powerful members?
How are the foreign policy goals of its most powerful members pursued - or not?
What role do domestic politics play when countries interact with the international organizations?
How does the pursuit of the private incentives of individuals working in IOs influence IO effectiveness?
What ideas and norms in international politics influenced the creation of the various IOs and what impact have the IOs in turn had on international ideas and norms?
In short, we are concerned with the political economy of international organizations.
As in other courses in political economy, we will grapple with centralized versus decentralized mechanisms of allocation, where the two mechanisms often interact. In International Political Economy, we consider the ways in which the various centralized and decentralized mechanisms of allocation within specific countries have effects across borders. The market forces and government policies in one country affect those in other countries -- for example, there are economic, security, and environmental externalities.
From this point of view, IOs can be considered responses to failures of decentralized mechanisms of allocation at the international level, or, simply put, responses to international market failures.
IOs are thus supranational centralized allocation mechanisms, which may or may not effectively achieve their ostensible goals. When evaluating whether these centralized mechanisms of allocation achieve their intended goals, it will be important to consider not just their inherent effects, but also an important counterfactual: what the world would be like in their absence? Note, the course makes no a priori judgments about the value of IOs, and students are encouraged to think critically about the constellation of IOs in the world. The course requires only that students consider both centralized and decentralized mechanisms of allocation as viable solutions to international problems - there is no assumed ideological preference for one approach over the other.
The challenges of trying to understand the interests, institutions, and information of actors in an international context are great, and much remains to be learned. The course is designed not just to familiarize students with IOs, but also to stimulate their curiosity about questions that really have yet to be answered satisfactorily. An important goal of the course is also the equip students with the analytical tools required to address such questions.
The course grade will be determined by three factors:
Participation - 30 points
To prepare for class, students are required to write a 2-page critical review of the readings each week. Each review should include
(1) a brief summary of the readings (1 point),
(2) some critical comments relating to the broader theoretical and methodological perspectives of the course (1 point), and
(3) some questions for further research (1 point).
Each review is thus worth 3 points. Note that there are 12 class sessions with required readings, for a possible 36 out of 30 points available. So, students are really required to do only 10 to get full credit in this section. The assignment is designed to give students an incentive to do the reading and be prepared for class discussions. The specific form and style of the papers is up to the students - the assignments should be written according to what suits the each individual student to prepare for class discussions. INDEED, I WILL ONLY GRADE ACTUAL CLASS PARTICIPATION - THE ASSIGNMENT IS REQUIRED ONLY AS A COMMITMENT DEVICE AND ITSELF WILL NOT BE GRADED. Students should use the 2-page papers as notes during the class to help them participate. They must also, however,
email a copy BEFORE class sessions
to receive credit for participation. If your email is not received before the beginning of class, you will get 0 credit for participation that day.
Seminar leader - 35 points
Each student will be designated to lead (or co-lead) a class discussion. Seminar leaders are required to circulate by email to all of the class participants five discussion questions for the class meeting. These discussion questions should be distributed BY THE SUNDAY EVENING BEFORE CLASS. The seminar leaders will also be charged with introducing the week’s topic by starting out class with a five-minute overview.
Policy paper - 35 points - DUE ELECTRONICALLY MAY 5 by 11:59am - I must receive your email by noon - no exceptions!!!
Students are required to write a policy paper about a specific country and a specific IO.
Paper specifications: *maximum* of 5 pages, double-spaced, 1 inch margins, 12-point font.
The paper should be about whether the country in question should be involved in some action with the IO.
For example, students can discuss whether the country should enter into an IMF program, or pursue a development project with the World Bank or a regional development organization, or file a grievance with the WTO, or pursue membership in NATO or the EU, or have UN peacekeeping operations introduced into their country, or pursue election to the UN Security Council.
Note that this is essentially a counterfactual exercise, where two hypothetical states of the world (one with the IO action and one without it) are compared. The counterfactuals should be constructed using various theoretical perspectives and through comparison with other cases. The comparisons can be with the country's own history, another country, or many countries -- note that relying on good statistical analyses of IO effectiveness can be particularly useful in generating counterfactuals.
The assignment is designed to bridge what we learn from academia to the policy world. Students are given the opportunity to explore in depth a particular IO, apply it to a particular country they have an interest in, and, importantly, to put the analytical tools of the class to use in a practical situation.
Books:Vreeland, James Raymond. 2007. The International Monetary Fund: Politics of Conditional Lending. New York: Routledge.
Hurd, Ian. 2007. After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the UN Security Council. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Chapman, Terrence. 2011. Securing Approval: Domestic Politics and Multilateral Authorization for War. Chicago IL: Chicago University Press.
Pevehouse, John C. 2005. Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization. New York: Cambridge University Press.
January 17: Introduction to International Organizations
In this class we will go over the syllabus, the goals of the course, and the requirements of the course. At the end of this class, students should have a thorough understanding of how participation will be graded for the remainder of the semester. Students should also begin to think about the final paper assignment: What is your country of interest? What is your international Organization of interest? Get a head start on the assignment by answering these questions today.
Recommended background readings (these are good readings in general for international political economy and international relations - not required for the course, simply suggested):
Przeworski, Adam. 2003. States and Markets: A Primer in Political Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Grieco, Joseph M. and John Ikenberry. 2003. The Economics of International Trade. In Grieco and Ikenberry, State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. pp19-56.
Powell, Robert. 1994. Review: Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate. International Organization 48 (2):313-44.
Checkel, Jeffrey T. Review Article: The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory.
World Politics 50 (2):324-348.
Frieden, Jeffry and Lisa Martin. 2002. International Political Economy: The State of the Sub-Discipline. In Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner, Political Science: The State of the Discipline. New York: W.W. Norton.
Lake, David A. 1993. Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential? International Studies Quarterly 37 (4):459-489.
January 24: What is the role of international organizations and do they really matter?
Class leader: Leszek Nowak
Mearsheimer, John. 1994. The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security winter 1994/95: 5-49.
READ all 5 of the short rejoinders to Mearsheimer (1994 - above) in International Security 20 (1, Summer 1995) by Keohane & Martin, Kupchan & Kupchan, Ruggie, Wendt, and Mearsheimer.
Abbot, Kenneth and Duncan Snidal. 1998. Why States Act through Formal Organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution 42:3-32.
Grant, Ruth W. and Robert O. Keohane. 2005. Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics. American Political Science Review 99(1):29-43.
Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?
International Organization 50 (3):379–406.
Johns, Leslie. 2007. A Servant of Two Masters: Communication and the Selection of International Bureaucrats. International Organization 61:245-275.
Wohlforth, William and Stephen G. Brooks. International Relations Theory and the Case Against Unilateralism. Perspectives on Politics 3(3):509-24.
Pape, Robert. 2005. Soft Balancing against the United States. International Security 30 (1):7-45.
Barnett, Michael N. and Martha Finnemore. 1999. The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. International Organization 53:699-732.
Kagan, Robert 2004. America's Crisis of Legitimacy. Foreign Affairs 83 (2 March/April):65-87.
Nye, Joseph Jr. 2004. The Decline of America’s Soft Power. Foreign Affairs 83 (3, May/June):16-20.
January 31: The diffusion of policy and domestic political institutions: the role of international organizations
Class leader: Patrick Sims
February 7: Special Class: President Zedillo
DETAILS, CLICK HERE
February 14: The World Bank and the Millenium Challenge Corporation
Class leader: Jayden Sparenborg
Fleck, Robert K. and Christopher Kilby. 2006. World Bank Independence: a Model and Statistical Analysis of U.S. Influence. Review of Development Economics 10 (2):224-40.
Kilby, Christopher. 2008. The Political Economy of Conditionality: An Empirical Analysis of World Bank Enforcement. Ms.
Abouharb, M. Rodwan, and David Cingranelli. 2006. The Human Rights Effects of World Bank Structural Adjustment Lending, 1981–2000. International Studies Quarterly 50 (2):233–62.
Frey, Bruno S. and Friedrich Schneider. 1986. Competing Models of International Lending Activity. Journal of Development Economics 20 (3):225-245.
Knack, Stephen and Aminur Rahman. 2007. Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients. Journal of Development Economics 83:176–197
Harrigan, Jane, Chengang Wang, and Hamed El-Said. 2006.
The Economic and Political Determinants of IMF and World Bank Lending in the Middle East and North Africa.
World Development 34 (2):247–270.
Johnson, Doug and Tristan Zajonc. 2006. Can Foreign Aid Create an Incentive for Good Governance? Evidence from the Millennium Challenge Corporation.
CID Graduate Student and Postdoctoral Fellow Working Paper No. 11.
Herrling, Sheila, Molly Kinder, and Steve Radelet. 2009. From Innovation to Impact: Next Steps for the Millennium Challenge Corporation
. MCA Monitor Analysis. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development.
Kilby, Christopher. 2013. An empirical assessment of informal influence in the World Bank. Economic Development and Cultural Change forthcoming.
Kilby, Christopher. 2011. What determines the size of aid projects? World Development forthcoming.
Andersen, Thomas Barnebeck, Henrik Hansen, and Thomas Markussen. 2006. US politics and World Bank IDA-lending. Journal of Development Studies 42 (5):772-794.
Wade, Robert Hunter. 2001. Making the World Development Report 2000: Attacking Poverty. World Development 29 (8):1435-41.
Marshall, Katherine. 2008. The World Bank: From reconstruction to development to equity. New York: Routledge. HG3881.5.W57 M38 2008. ENTIRE.
The Millennium Challenge Corporation
Web Page. Please be sure to read:
February 21: The United Nations I: Human Rights Conventions
Class leader: Timothy Dee
Hathaway, Oona A. 2007. Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties? Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (4):588-621.
Class leader: Elizabeth Lechner
Wotipka, C. M. and K. Tsutsui. 2008. Global Human Rights and State Sovereignty: Nation-States' Ratifications of International Human Rights Treaties, 1965-2001. Sociological Forum 23 (4):724-754.
Class leader: Kyle Saubert
Goodliffe, Jay and Darren Hawkins. 2006. Explaining Commitment: States and the Convention against Torture. Journal of Politics 68 (2):358–371.
Class leader: Daniel Lim
Vreeland, James Raymond. 2008. Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture. International Organization 62 (1):65-101.
Class leader: Thomas Mancinelli
Hollyer, James R. and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2009. Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Sign the Convention Against Torture? Signaling, Domestic Politics, and Non-Compliance. Ms. NYU.
Class leader: Zachary Pusch
Lebovic, James and Eric Voeten. 2006. The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNHRC. International Studies Quarterly 50 (4):861-888.
Class leader: Sarah Andely
Linda Camp Keith. 1999. The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does it Make
a Difference in Human Rights Behaviour? Journal of Peace Research 36:95–118.
Class leader: Cynthia Cheatham
Hafner-Burton, Emilie Marie, and Kiyo Tsutsui. 2007. Justice Lost! The Failure of International Human Rights Law to Matter Where Needed Most. Journal of Peace Research 44 (4)407-425.
Class leader: Marek Hlavac
Hathaway, Oona A. 2002. Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? The Yale Law Journal 111 (8):1935–2042.
Landman, Todd. 2005. Review Article: The Political Science of Human Rights. British Journal of Political Science 35 (3):549–72.
Wotipka, C. M. and K. Tsutsui. 2008. Global Human Rights and State
Sovereignty: Nation-States' Ratifications of International Human Rights
Treaties, 1965-2001. Sociological Forum 23 (4):724-754.
Wotipka, C. M. and F. O. Ramirez. 2008. "World Society and Human
Rights: An Event History Analysis of the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women." Pp. 303-343 in The
Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy. Beth A. Simmons, Frank
Dobbin, Geoffrey Garrett (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Neumayer, Eric. 2005. Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights? Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (6):925–53.